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ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: INTO 
THE BLACK HOLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PAUL FINKELMAN*
The legal history of the Fourteenth Amendment is something of a con-
stitutional black hole. Scholars are drawn to this galactic force of constitu-
tional law, pulled into the virtually endless debates over its meaning and 
the original intent of its framers.1 This seemingly irresistible force of (con-
stitutional) nature lured Bill Nelson into writing his book on the Fourteenth 
Amendment.2 This article explores some of the ways that Nelson’s book 
illuminates our understanding of the Amendment and ways that we might 
further explore the Supreme Court’s failure to follow through on the gen-
eral intent and the basic goals of the Amendment’s framers.
In Part I of this article, I examine the general problem of understand-
ing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting the difficulties of 
determining the “intent” of this complicated and complex Amendment. In 
Part II of this article, I examine the legislative debates and the important 
research presented in Nelson’s book. In Part III, I turn to Nelson’s discus-
sion of how the late nineteenth century Supreme Court interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment in economic cases and civil rights cases. Here, and 
in Part IV of this article, I suggest that Nelson ought to have looked more 
closely at the way the race cases actually affected African Americans. In 
Part V, I argue that the Court was deeply disingenuous in this period and 
was intellectually inconsistent and dishonest in its approach to race cases. 
The Court ignored its own economic analysis when dealing with race cases, 
rejected the plain meaning and intent of the framers on many issues involv-
ing race, and looked the other way as Southern states made war on civil 
* Justice Pike Hall, Jr. Visiting Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State Univer-
sity. I thank Michelle Humphries of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center Library and Bob Emery of the 
Albany Law School Library for their help on this article. I also thank R.B. Bernstein for his terrific 
editing skills and Gabriel Jack Chin and Owen R. Williams for this help and suggestions. 
1. I plead guilty to this temptation as well. See Paul Finkelman, The Historical Context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIVIL RTS L. REV. 389-409 (2004) [hereinafter Finkelman, 
Historical Context]; Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
36 AKRON L. REV. 671-692 (2003) [hereinafter Finkelman, John Bingham]; Paul Finkelman, Prelude to 
the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986) 
[hereinafter Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment]. 
2. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).
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rights and the liberties of former slaves and their descendants. Finally, in 
Part VI, I argue that the Court did not have to take this direction, and at the 
very time the Court’s majority supported segregation, most northern states 
passed laws to protect civil rights. This forgotten history of northern civil 
rights legislation suggests that there was significant support in the nation 
for rejecting segregation in favor of equality.
I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S COMPLICATED STRUCTURE
Scholars, lawyers, and jurists interrogate the history, origin, and de-
bates over the passage and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is 
in the end a frustrating and not particularly easy task for many reasons. The 
first interpretative problem with the Fourteenth Amendment is its size.
The Amendment, passed by Congress in 1866 and ratified in 1868, is 
the longest addition to the Constitution and the only one that is devoted to 
more than one subject. Indeed, part of the difficulty in interpreting and 
understanding the Amendment stems from the large number of subjects it 
covers.3 The Amendment has five sections, all dealing with separate issues. 
Complicating an understanding of the Amendment is the different empha-
3. The full text of the Amendment is:
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. 
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial offic-
ers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any 
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear 
to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the 
United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection 
or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress 
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts in-
curred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or 
any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims 
shall be held illegal and void.
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article.
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
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ses that Congress placed on these provisions. Most of the Congressional 
debate focused on Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Amendment,4 as Congress 
tried to figure out how to prevent former Confederates from regaining po-
litical power in the South and the nation, which would enable them to op-
press former slaves and white unionists.5 As one of the most recent books 
on the Amendment notes, “[T]he debates did not focus primarily on Sec-
tion 1, which today is the Fourteenth Amendment.”6 Rather, most of the 
debates were “on Sections 2 and 3, which dealt respectively with Negro 
suffrage and apportionment and with the exclusion of rebel leaders from 
office.”7 The Congress focused on these issues because the victorious 
northerners who dominated Congress wanted to avoid the ironic result of 
the Civil War that the end of slavery meant the southern states would have 
more representation in Congress than they had had before the War. Before 
the War, the South’s slave population had been counted for representation 
and in the electoral college under the three-fifths clause of the Constitu-
tion.8 But after the War, the former slaves would be counted as whole per-
sons, which would increase the South’s power in national politics. If blacks 
voted, then this change would have been a legitimate and meaningful out-
come of the War. But before the adoptions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments,9 the regulation of voting was left entirely up to the states. 
Thus, the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment tried to force the former 
slave states to enfranchise blacks on the same basis as whites by threaten-
ing to reduce their representation in Congress if blacks were not allowed to 
vote.10 Nelson’s careful history of the drafting of the Amendment and the 
debates over black enfranchisement11 shows how cumbersome and ineffec-
tive the Fourteenth Amendment solution was.
Congress similarly spent considerable energy trying to prevent former 
Confederates from regaining political power, although in the end, as Nel-
son shows, the results were relatively limited.12 Nelson barely mentions 
4. JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 7-10 (1997).
5. NELSON, supra note 2, at 46-48.
6. BOND, supra note 4, at 8-9.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. For a discussion of this history of this clause, see PAUL 
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON ch. 1 (3d 
ed., 2014). On the application of this clause to the electoral college, see Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery 
Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145 (2002).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting discrimination in voting on the basis of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
11. NELSON, supra note 2, at 46-58, 98-100.
12. Id. at 47-49.
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Section 4 of the Amendment, dealing with the repudiation of Confederate 
debt and the promise that any legally authorized debt of the United States 
“shall not be questioned.” This is not a criticism of his book, since there 
has been very little litigation over this section. Ironically, this clause 
reemerged as an important constitutional provision in 2013 when the gov-
ernment was forced to shut down because of the refusal of the Republican 
majority in the House of Representatives to extend the debt ceiling of the 
national government. At this time there were public discussions of whether 
Congress could repudiate existing federal debt or whether the United States 
could default on its debt.
While Congress spent a great deal of energy on Sections 2, 3, and 4 of 
the Amendment, most of the jurisprudence over the Amendment has re-
volved around on Section 1, dealing with citizenship, fundamental rights, 
due process, and equal protection, and the power of Congress to enforce 
Section 1, which is found in Section 5.13 These clauses have led to almost 
all civil rights litigation and all cases incorporating the Bill of Rights to the 
states.
The first section is the most important substantive part of the Amend-
ment for modern scholars and jurists. “Federal constitutional adjudication 
since Reconstruction can be viewed in large part as commentary on these 
amendments, in particular the Fourteenth.”14 The section deals with citi-
zenship, privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection. This 
section of the Amendment is the basis of most civil rights legislation and 
litigation in the nation and all Supreme Court decisions focusing on the 
application of the Bill of Rights to the states and modern civil liberties 
cases involving state law. Many modern cases dealing with civil rights, 
civil liberties, and criminal justice in the states are based on this section of 
the Amendment. Section 1 of the Amendment is also tied to Section 5, 
which empowers Congress to “enforce by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article.”
While these two sections are at the heart of modern Fourteenth 
Amendment litigation and of modern scholarly debates over the meaning of 
the Amendment, the Congress in 1866 devoted comparatively little time 
and energy to this clause when debating the Amendment.15 As noted above, 
most of the debates in Congress were about the other sections of the 
13. BOND, NO EASY WALK, supra note 4, at 8-9.
14. John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the 
Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Law, 3 ASIAN AM.
L.J. 55, 61 (1996) (citing NELSON, supra note 2).
15. BOND, supra note 4, at 8-9.
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Amendment, dealing with post-Civil War representation,16 the disfran-
chisement of former Confederate leaders,17 and post-Civil War debt.18
Most Fourteenth Amendment litigation has centered on just two parts 
of Section 1 of the Amendment: the Due Process Clause19 and the Equal 
Protection Clause.20 In part this is because in The Slaughterhouse Cases21
the Supreme Court completely eviscerated the meaning and potential of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the new amendment, refusing to use it 
to apply most of the protections of the Bill of Rights to the states.22 Thus, 
starting in the 1920s23 the Court has used the Due Process Clause to apply 
most, but not all,24 of the provisions in the Bill of Rights to the states 
through the arcane and almost incomprehensible doctrine of “incorpora-
tion.” Under the incorporation doctrine the Court has held that most of the 
Bill of Rights also limits the states because the liberties found in the Bill of
Rights are “incorporated” in the term (or concept of) “liberty” found in the 
Due Process Clause of Section 1 of the Amendment. Thus, the Due Process 
Clause prevents the states from abridging most of the liberties found in the 
Bill of Rights.25 The Due Process Clause has also been used to strike down 
state economic regulations, on the grounds that these regulations interfere 
with the “liberty” of contract, which the Court has also found to be protect-
ed by the Amendment.26 Similarly, the Court has often used the Due Pro-
cess Clause to limit state economic regulations on the grounds that they 
deprive people of their “property,” which is also protected by the Clause.
Nelson’s book, which is at the heart of this article, provides enormous-
ly useful information for understanding how Section 1 was written and the 
motivations behind those who wrote it. The first two thirds of the book 
cover those subjects, and the last third of the book is devoted to an analysis 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”).
20. Id. (“[N]or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”).
21. Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-
House Co., 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
22. See infra Part III (discussing the Slaughterhouse Cases).
23. See Gitlow v New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
24. For example, the Court has never incorporated the Seventh Amendment (civil juries). Similar-
ly, by allowing the states to have non-unanimous juries or juries of fewer than twelve people, the Court 
has not fully incorporated the right to a jury in a criminal trial to the states. The Court has never applied 
the Third Amendment to the states or for that matter had a case involving the Third Amendment.
25. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
26. Allgeyer v, Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); 
Coppage v, Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
1024 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:3
of the judicial doctrine that developed around the Amendment in the first 
four decades or so after its ratification.
The last third of Nelson’s book is less satisfactory than Nelson’s path 
breaking research and important analysis of the debates leading to the 
Amendment earlier in the book. In the end, Nelson does not confront the 
Court’s racism and cynical rejection of liberty in the late nineteenth centu-
ry, and the serious damage the Court did to American civil liberties and 
civil rights. Nelson explains what the Court did, but in a narrowly legalistic 
and doctrinal way. He tells us how the Court created its doctrine but does 
not explain why the Court took the direction it did. Moreover, in the end I 
think he is far too kind to the way the Court treated race in this period. 
Nelson’s analysis parses doctrine without explaining the horrors that result-
ed from the doctrine. Nor does the book explain that the Court need not 
have taken the route it took in supporting segregation and racism for about 
half a century after the end of Reconstruction.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEBATES OVER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Let me start by noting that Nelson’s book is one of the best—if not the 
best—explorations of the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment in Con-
gress, in the state legislatures, and in the post-Civil War legal community. 
His research of the drafting of the Amendment, and his analysis of the 
many changes the wording went through, is the best available. He offers 
coherent and plausible explanations of why the wording changes were 
made. But as a careful historian he also notes that there are no certain ex-
planations for all the wording changes. He devotes the first two thirds of 
this book to these issues. This research and his analysis stand up extraordi-
narily well. Nelson teaches us that there are some very clear meanings to 
the intentions of those who wrote the Amendment on some issues but also 
some rather uncertain meanings for other issues. He deftly explores the 
many complicated goals and intentions of the framers.
For example, Nelson demonstrates that senators and representatives
who came from an abolitionist or antislavery background, as well as more 
conservative Republicans who were less hostile to slavery, almost unani-
mously agreed on some goals of the Amendment such as black citizenship 
and the need to protect fundamental civil liberties from overreaching or 
oppressive state governments. The majority of Republicans unhesitatingly 
agreed on birthright citizenship for people born in the United States. The 
minority on this issue (such as most West Coast Republicans) were hostile 
to citizenship for the American-born children of Chinese immigrants. But 
when they lost on this issue, most of them nevertheless supported the entire 
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Amendment.27 However, on other issues, such as black enfranchisement, 
Republicans differed.28 Virtually all the Republicans in Congress and in the 
state legislatures that ratified the Amendment understood that they were 
securing citizenship for all people born in the United States, including all 
former slaves born before the Amendment’s adoption.29 The majority of 
the Republicans favored a broad notion of citizenship, as illustrated by the 
arguments Pennsylvania Senator Simon Cameron made in 1869, after he 
returned to the Senate following his service as Secretary of War and U.S. 
Ambassador to Russia during the Civil War. Cameron argued that citizen-
ship and equal voting rights “invites into our country everybody; the negro, 
the Irishman, the German, the Frenchman, the Scotchman, the Englishman, 
and the Chinaman.”30 Most west coast Republicans did not want the 
Amendment to confer citizenship for the children of Chinese immigrants. 
California Congressman William Higby argued that the Chinese were “a 
pagan race”31 incapable of being citizens. Nevertheless, he voted for the 
amendment,32 as did every other California and Oregon Republican, know-
27. One exception was Senator Edgar Cowan who spoke out against Chinese immigration and 
was one of the few Republicans to vote against the Amendment. Cowan was not reelected after his one 
term in the Senate, and left the party to serve in the administration of Andrew Johnson. He was replaced 
by Simon Cameron who openly and enthusiastically supported an expansion of rights for people of all 
races. While not in the Senate during the debates over the Amendment, Cameron exemplifies the Re-
publican push for equal rights for all people in the nation.
28. NELSON, supra note 2, at 87.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side.”).
30. Cameron quoted in NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 87. Oddly and 
inexplicably, Nelson uses this quotation from Cameron to show support for the implied expansion of 
the franchise in the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the speech was made after the Amendment 
had been ratified.
31. Most of the west coast members of the House and Senate were unabashed in their an-
ti-Chinese positions. Consider the speech by Rep. William Higby of California:
The Chinese are nothing but a pagan race. They are an enigma to me, although I have lived 
among them for fifteen years. You cannot make good citizens of them; they do not learn the 
language of the country; and you can communicate with them only with the greatest difficul-
ty, as their language is the most difficult of all those spoken; they even dig up their dead while 
decaying in their graves, strip the putrid flesh from the bones, and transport the bones back to 
China. They bring their clay and wooden gods with them to this country, and as we are a free 
and tolerant people, we permit them to bow down and worship them.
Sir, they do not propagate in our country. A generation is not growing up in the State, 
except an insignificant few in comparison with the great number among us. Judging from the 
daily exhibition in our streets, and the well established repute among their females, virtue is 
an exception to the general rule. They buy and sell their women like cattle, and the trade is 
mostly for the purpose of prostitution. That is their character. You cannot make citizens of 
them.
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2756 (1866) quoted in John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and 
Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments and Civil Rights Law, 3 ASIAN L. J. 55, at 80 (1996).
32. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (June 13, 1866), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=270.
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ing that they had lost on this issue.33 In effect, they understood clearly what 
they were voting for, even if they did not particularly like it.34 Virtually all 
supporters of the Amendment agreed that it would protect the “civil rights” 
of blacks and everyone else,35 but, as Nelson shows, they did not necessari-
ly agree on the substantive content of civil rights, equal protection, or even 
due process.
Nelson also notes that during this time ideas, views, and understand-
ings of equality were in constant flux. The changing nature of public and 
private views on race is illustrated by a constituent letter that ended up in 
the papers of Ohio’s Senator John Sherman, a leader of the moderate wing 
of the Republican Party and the brother of the great war hero General Wil-
liam Tecumseh Sherman. This correspondent noted that his “mind in the 
last few years has undergone some change in regard to the intellect of the 
negro. I find the negro child just as apt in learning their alphabet as the 
white and why not anything else.”36 Thus, he was ready to accept equality 
of rights and even voting rights for blacks. This letter reflected the senti-
ments of many in the northern electorate and those who represented them 
in both houses of Congress.
Senator John Conness of California embodied the complexity of the 
debates, the changes taking place in the minds of members of Congress, 
and the uncertain meaning of the language of the Amendment. He began 
his political career as a Douglas Democrat, and as such he opposed anti-
slavery Republicans and was unsympathetic to racial equality. Almost all 
white Californians were deeply hostile to civil rights protections or citizen-
ship for Chinese immigrants or their American-born children. When he 
entered politics, Conness doubtless reflected the views of his constituents 
33. Id. Indicating the Representatives Donald C. McRuer, William Higby, and John Bidwell of 
California, and James Henry Dickey Henderson of Oregon all voted yes on the Amendment, even 
though it failed to exclude Chinese-Americans from birthright citizenship. The Republican Senator 
from Oregon, George Henry Williams, and the Republican from California, John Conness, voted yes. 
The Democrat from Oregon, James W. Nesmith was absent and the Democrat from California, James 
A. McDougall voted no. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1866). Nelson mistakenly 
asserts that Oregon had two Republican Senators, and one was Henry W. Corbett (NELSON, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 102) and quotes a speech by Corbett. But that speech is 
from 1869, after the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified. Corbett was not in the Senate in 1866.
34. The one exception to this was California Republican Senator John Conness. Nelson quotes 
Senator John Conness of California declaring his support for citizenship for the American-born children 
of Chinese immigrants. NELSON, supra note 2, at 114. Conness was an Irish immigrant and, despite his 
racism toward Chinese (as indicated in the speech quoted below), he supported birthright citizenship for 
the children of immigrants. This position probably cost him his seat in the Senate and after his term 
expired he left politics and later moved to Boston. 
35. NELSON, supra note 2, at 163.
36. NELSON, supra note 2, at 87 (quoting Letter of E.J. Petre to Mr. and Mrs. Hopley, January 25, 
1866, which is in the papers of Senator John Sherman) (emphasis in the original). Petre sent this letter 
to the Hopleys, who in turn apparently sent it on to Senator Sherman.
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on this issue. But, during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, he 
declared his support for the idea “that the children of all parentage whatev-
er, born in California, should be regarded and treated as citizens of the 
United States, entitled to equal civil rights with other citizens of the United 
States.”37 He urged his Senate colleagues to take “no further trouble on 
account of the Chinese in California or on the Pacific coast.”38 He asserted 
that California would be “able to take care of them and to provide against 
any evils that may flow from their presence among us.”39 He also said that 
Californians were “entirely ready to accept the provision proposed in this 
constitutional amendment, that the children born here of Mongolian parents 
shall be declared by the Constitution of the United States to be entitled to 
civil rights and to equal protection before the law with others.”40
Despite Conness’s strong endorsement of “equality,” we have no idea 
what he believed would be the substantive rights afforded by the Amend-
ment to the American-born children of Chinese immigrants, other than 
citizenship. He did not advocate changing the naturalization laws to allow 
Chinese immigrants to become citizens and his speech is racist and white 
supremacist in its tone. Nevertheless, Conness’s speech, like much of Nel-
son’s other evidence, shows both that concepts of rights and equality were 
in flux at this time, and that in general, they were becoming more expan-
sive. Even though there were many general ideas about what such phrases 
as “equal protection” or “privileges and immunities” meant, no one com-
pletely described them, and no votes or reports asserted or defined what 
they meant. Nelson’s scholarship underscores the context of the observa-
tion that John Bingham, the primary author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, liked the term “privileges and immunities” because its “eu-
phony and indefiniteness of meaning were a charm to him.”41 At the same 
time, he impressively shows that the authors of the Amendment and its 
leading supporters believed this clause would make what Bingham called 
the “immortal bill of rights” applicable to the states.42 Similarly, as Nelson 
notes,
Jacob Howard of Michigan, the floor manager of the amendment in the 
Senate, also contended that the privileges and immunities clause of sec-
tion one comprehended “the personal rights guaranteed and secured by 
37. Id. at 114 (quoting Senator Conness).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. These comments are almost certainly an exaggeration and it is unlikely that most white 
Californians embraced Chinese citizenship.
41. Quoted in MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL 
REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869, at 170 (1974).
42. Bingham quoted in NELSON, supra note 2, at 117.
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the first eight amendments of the Constitution, such as the freedom of 
speech and of the press; the right of the people peaceably to assemble 
and petition the Government for a redress of grievances . . . .”43
Nelson’s book is quite different from the work of scholars who have 
tried to find a single, definitive understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Lawyers and judges have often used—or more likely misused—
history to reach a certain conclusion without any regard for nuance, com-
plexity, or even the very real possibility that there is no certainty about the 
intentions of those who wrote the Amendment. Those who think that histo-
ry will offer them a Rosetta Stone to understand the Fourteenth Amend-
ment44 are unlikely to be successful in their quest. Some scholars and 
lawyers have sought a “true” and certain original meaning of the Amend-
ment, often with a self-conscious political agenda to undermine integration, 
affirmative action, and even substantive racial fairness.45 Such scholarship 
is usually narrowly focused, and often not very good.46 It is law office his-
tory—designed to reach a predetermined outcome rather than to actually 
understand the past. Nelson’s book, on the other hand, shows the complexi-
ty of the debates and the impossibility of answering many of the modern 
questions that swirl around the Fourteenth Amendment.47 Even while ex-
43. NELSON, supra note 2, at 118-19. In the rest of the quotation, Howard summarized most of 
the other rights found in the Bill of Rights.
44. I have discussed this problem elsewhere, including Paul Finkelman, The Historical Context of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 1 and Brief of Paul Finkelman and 75 Other Historians and 
Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 
133 S. Ct 1633 (No. 12-682) [hereinafter Finkelman Brief].
45. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1977); THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS (Alfred 
Avins ed., 1967).
46. Robert J. Cottrol, Static History and Brittle Jurisprudence: Raoul Berger and the Problem of 
Constitutional Methodology, 26 B.C. L. REV. 353 (1985); Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, supra note 1; see also Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: 
The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349-98 (1989) (discussing the general problem of 
intentionalism).
47. In this context Nelson’s sophisticated history reflects the wisdom of Chief Justice Earl War-
ren’s conclusion in Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) that it is really impossible to know the 
intentions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to the specific policy of integrated 
public schools because in 1866—when the amendment was written—there was not an elaborate public 
school system in the nation. After acknowledging the “exhaustive” work of attorneys on both sides of 
the case to find an answer to the questions posed in Brown in the debates over the Amendment, Chief 
Justice Warren concluded: “This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these
sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they 
are inconclusive.” Id. at 489. Warren noted that there were virtually no public schools in the South 
before the Civil War or immediately after it, so that it is hard to know what the framers of the Amend-
ment expected it would accomplish for a public school system that did not in fact exist. Id. at 489-90. 
Thus, speaking for a unanimous Court Warren declared: “we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when 
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider 
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout 
the Nation.” Id. at 492-93. Had the historical knowledge of schooling, public education, and antebellum 
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amining the many competing arguments about the Amendment, Nelson 
demonstrates that there was substantial agreement on some of the goals and 
purposes of the Amendment, such as citizenship, property rights, funda-
mental civil liberties, and basic racial equality, even if there may not have 
been agreement on the details of what all these ideas meant.
III. THE COURT, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS
Having demonstrated the substantial agreement among the framers 
and ratifiers of the Amendment on many issues and general goals of the 
Amendment, Nelson also shows that in the late nineteenth century, justices 
often ignored the plain meaning of much of the Amendment and also ig-
nored the debates over these clauses even when the debates offered very 
clear guidance about the meaning (or some of the meaning) of a particular 
clause.48 Nelson notes that in the Court’s first interpretation of the 
Amendment, in the Slaughterhouse Cases49 in 1873, “[b]oth of Justice 
Miller’s approaches [in his opinion for the majority] for narrowing the 
reach of section one were flatly inconsistent with the history of its framing 
in Congress, and its ratification by the state legislatures.”50 Nelson correct-
ly concludes that the arguments in Miller’s majority opinion in the Slaugh-
terhouse Cases “constituted clear instances of judicial lawmaking of which 
Justice Miller must have been quite aware.”51
Nelson’s discussion of how the Court interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment focuses on two quite different issues—economic regulations 
(usually of property and contract) and race. The constitutional history of 
race relations been better understood, Warren might however have noted that in the state with the most 
sophisticated public school system, Massachusetts, segregation was in fact illegal. See Finkelman, 
Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 430. Warren might also have noted that some of 
the strongest supporters of full racial equality in the Fourteenth Amendment debates, such as Senator 
Charles Sumner, came from that state.
48. One area where this did not take place is in the citizenship clause. At the time of the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, naturalization was limited by statute to only white immigrants. Act of 
March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (establishing a uniform rule of naturalizations). In 1870, a new act allowed 
naturalization for people of African ancestry. Act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 254 (amending the naturali-
zation law and punishing crimes against the same). But at this time, immigrants from China and other 
parts of East Asia could not become naturalized citizens. Opponents of civil rights for Asians (including 
the officials of the United States) argued that the American-born children of Chinese immigrants were 
not full citizens despite the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), the Court correctly held that all people born in the United States 
(except the children of diplomats) are citizens of the United States.
49. Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-
House Co., 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
50. NELSON, supra note 2, at 163.
51. Id.
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these two issues both began with The Slaughterhouse Cases in 1873.52
Slaughterhouse was ostensibly about economic rights. The issue before the 
Court, discussed in greater detail below, was whether Louisiana violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring the butchers in New Orleans to 
rent space in a single central slaughterhouse. The butchers, all of whom 
were white and many of whom were Confederate veterans, argued this law 
violated their privileges and immunities, which the new Amendment pro-
tected, because the law prevented them from engaging in their chosen pro-
fession where they wanted to do business, and required them to pay fees to 
use the central slaughterhouse. On its face, the case was not apparently 
about race, but the majority opinion discussed race at length. I will return to 
the issues of race that began with Slaughterhouse later in this article, after 
first discussing the economic issues of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
what Nelson teaches us about them.
The economic issues from Slaughterhouse focused on whether state 
economic regulations of property and contract violated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which the butchers 
claimed protected their economic interests.53 Eventually the Court would 
constrict the power of the states to regulate economic activity only to laws 
that were necessary “for the public welfare,”54 which the Court would very 
narrowly define.55 This line of cases led the Court to allow some economic 
regulations to protect worker safety,56 but at the same time the Court struck 
down numerous state and federal laws to protect the health and welfare of 
workers, to ban child labor, to protect the right of workers to fair contracts, 
and laws limiting hours for most workers or setting minimum wages. This 
line of case would reach its apex in the early twentieth century with such 
cases as Lochner v. New York57 and Coppage v. Kansas.58 Nelson points 
out that the Court rejected economic protections in Slaughterhouse and
52. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
53. To put this line of cases and jurisprudence into historical perspective, see WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-
1937 (1998).
54. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), quoted in NELSON, supra note 2, at 198. 
55. See, for example, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where the Court struck down a 
health and safety regulation limited the number of hours that bakers could work on the grounds that the 
regulation was “unreasonable.”
56. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), in which the Court upheld a state regulation of 
mine safety and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) upholding a state law limiting the number of 
hours that women would work in the laundry industry on the grounds that labor in this industry was 
particularly harmful to the health of women. These of course contrast with Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905).
57. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
58. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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then came to accept them just few years later, agreeing that the Amendment 
“protected property and by implication other rights against infringement by 
the states,”59 but that the Justices also “recognized that the states could 
regulate protected rights as long their regulations were reasonable.”60
Nelson offers a lawyerly and legalistic analysis of the Court’s eco-
nomic decisions, and his discussion is oddly disconnected from politics and 
history. This disconnect is particularly strange, because the first two-thirds 
of the book are so smartly and successfully tied to history. It is almost as if 
Nelson the historian disappeared after Chapter VI and Nelson the lawyer 
suddenly took over. In the last few chapters of the book, Nelson explains 
the Court’s decisions on their own terms. He does a very good job of this, 
although in a quite (and for Nelson unusual) formalistic way.
Nelson’s discussion of Slaughterhouse illustrates this problem. As I 
noted above, Nelson persuasively argues that Justice Miller’s majority 
opinion misconstrued the overwhelming view that the new Amendment 
should protect substantive property rights.61 He also notes that within a few 
years after Slaughterhouse, the Court accepted the arguments of the dis-
senters in Slaughterhouse, that the Fourteenth Amendment provided sub-
stantive protections of private property.62 This transition was critical to 
Constitutional development and led to Lochner and its progeny.63 Indeed, 
the Court’s elaboration of the theory of “substantive due process” as a basis 
for striking down state economic regulations in order to protect property 
went beyond the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court struck down federal 
regulations of child labor,64 wages,65 labor conditions,66 and developed 
what today seems to be an absurd and cynical distinction between manufac-
turing and commerce that undermined anti-trust regulation67 and crippled 
economic and social reform for almost half a century.68
The most important outcome of Slaughterhouse was not that the 
butchers lost, or that Justice Miller misread the Fourteenth Amendment to 
59. NELSON, supra note 2, at 174.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 163.
62. Id. at 174.
63. For a succinct discussion of the evolution of the law in this period, see 2 MELVIN I. UROFSKY 
& PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
591-661, 697-716 (3d ed. 2012).
64. Hammer v. Daggenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
65. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
66. Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Adair v. United States, 206 U.S. 161 (1908).
67. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
68. These changes began in the late 1930s. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937). 
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deny property rights to the butchers. Rather, it was Miller’s unfortunate and 
historically problematic reading—or perhaps more correctly his misread-
ing—of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Indeed, Miller could have reached the same result—that the creation 
of a central slaughterhouse in New Orleans was constitutional—with a 
traditional “police powers” analysis, and by so doing avoided altogether the 
need to give a full blown analysis of the new Amendment.69 Furthermore, 
as Nelson shows, the Court soon abandoned Miller’s economic analysis, 
even as the Justices acknowledged that “police regulations, intended for the 
preservation of the public health and the public order” were not barred by 
the Amendment, and that “[s]o much of the Louisiana law as partook of 
this character was never objected to.”70 In other words, if Miller had simply 
offered a “police powers” analysis the Court might have been unanimous in 
Slaughterhouse, with no need to discuss the meaning of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.71
At issue in Slaughterhouse was a Louisiana law that created a single 
place—a central slaughterhouse—for the butchering of livestock in New 
Orleans. This law, giving a monopoly to the owners of the Crescent City 
Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Company, was tied to party poli-
tics in Reconstruction-era Louisiana. To the extent that American legal 
traditions frowned on monopolies, a court might have found that this law 
violated some basic constitutional rights of the butchers who were forced to 
use the central slaughterhouse. This indeed was the butchers’ argument; 
they asserted that this state-imposed monopoly infringed on their “privileg-
es and immunities” as U.S. citizens by denying them the right to practice 
their business as they wished.
But the centralization of slaughtering animals was also an important 
public health regulation in an age when urban sanitation was in its infancy 
and slaughterhouses were the cause of numerous diseases and epidemics. 
The independent butchers sued because they claimed it was inconvenient 
and costly to slaughter their animals in a single place, even though they 
were only required to pay a modest fee for their use of the slaughterhouse. 
The butchers claimed the law violated their rights under the Thirteenth 
Amendment (that it was a form of involuntary servitude) and that it also 
69. This argument is best developed in MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS:
SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2003) [hereinafter 
ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS]; see also RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE
SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(2003).
70. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 136-37 (1873).
71. See generally ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS, supra note 69.
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denied them their privileges and immunities under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Miller might have avoided most of the Constitutional issues by ap-
plying a “police powers” analysis to uphold the power of the state to 
regulate public health and safety by creating a central slaughterhouse. Had 
he done this, Justice Miller would have avoided the Fourteenth Amendment 
issue since the Fourteenth Amendment, whatever it means, allowed a po-
lice powers exception for “reasonable” regulations. He might have had to 
explain why the Fourteenth Amendment did not trump states’ police pow-
ers, because no law would be constitutional if it overtly violated the 
Amendment. But such a strategy would not have required him to give a 
detailed analysis of what the new Amendment protected, and certainly 
would not have required him to limit the Amendment’s coverage to blacks 
(which was clearly not the only intent of the Congress or of the ratifiers)72
nor eliminate any enforceable content from the Privilege and Immunities 
Clause.
However, Miller did not take the simple and logical path of upholding 
the Louisiana law. Instead, he offered an elaborate analysis of the Four-
teenth Amendment that limited its scope to former slaves, and then eviscer-
ated the meaning of the “privileges and immunities clause,” which might 
have been used to protect the fundamental civil liberties of the very former 
slaves he claimed the Amendment sought to protect. The result is that the 
Court has never since used this clause to protect fundamental liberties.73
As Nelson shows, it is clear from the Congressional debates and those 
in the state legislatures that the framers of the Amendment believed that it 
would protect many groups in addition to African Americans, including 
“the Chinese, Indians, women, and religious minorities,”74 as well as pro-
tecting “another group—namely, Northern whites who were migrating to 
the South after the Civil War and were threatened with potentially discrim-
inatory legislation at the hands of Southern states and localities.”75 We 
could add to this list southern white Unionists, blacks who were free before 
the War (and thus needed protection from state legislatures in both the 
North and the South), and a special subclass of all these people, U.S. army 
veterans, both black and white, who remained in the South after the War. 
72. NELSON, supra note 2, at 163.
73. Some scholars have argued for a revival of the clause and in sense a reversal of the doctrine 
from Slaughterhouse. See Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: ‘Its Hour Come 
Round at Last?’ 1972 WASH. UNIV. LAW QUARTERLY 405 (1972); Kimberly Shankman & Roger Pilon, 
Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and 
the Federal Government, 3 TEX. REV. OF L. & POL’Y 1 (1998); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST (1980). 
74. NELSON, supra note 2, at 163.
75. Id.
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As the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction (which led to the 
Amendment) makes clear,76 they too were threatened by the white elec-
torate in the South, which immediately after the War was dominated by 
former Confederates. As Nelson writes: “No one who sat in Congress or in 
the state legislatures that dealt with the Fourteenth Amendment,” the actors 
who ratified the Amendment, “doubted that section one was designed put 
to rest any doubt about the power of the federal government to protect basic 
common law rights of property and contract.”77 But they also believed that 
Section 1 would protect the basic civil liberties of blacks, southern white 
Unionists, and northerners who were living in the South, including former 
U.S. Army soldiers who chose to remain there after the War.
Stated another way, the Amendment protected everyone in the United 
States from arbitrary and capricious abuses by their state governments. This 
class of protected persons would have included even the Confederate veter-
ans who made up the bulk of the butchers suing in Slaughterhouse. But, if 
the law regulating slaughtering in New Orleans was reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and not discriminatory, then it would have passed muster under the 
police powers of the state. Justice Miller failed to pursue this common 
sense approach. His opinion, as noted above, essentially wrote the Privileg-
es and Immunities Clause out of the Amendment. After Slaughterhouse,
the Court almost never again applied this clause to a case. This holding, 
and not the economic analysis of Miller’s majority opinion, is the most 
important aspect of Slaughterhouse.
By eviscerating the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Court pre-
vented any federal protection of civil liberties from state law until the 
1920’s when the Court began its long and sometimes incoherent journey of 
“selective incorporation,” applying piecemeal provisions of the Bill of 
Rights to the states.78 Nelson points out that the failure to understand and 
apply the Privileges and Immunities Clause to protect basic liberties violat-
ed the clear intentions of those who voted for the Amendment, even if their 
notion of what liberties might be protected was ambiguous. Nelson does 
not pursue this issue or illuminate what the cost of this strategy was for 
blacks and white Unionists in the South in the nineteenth century, and eve-
ryone else in the United States who faced state deprivations of civil liber-
ties until the mid-twentieth century. Instead, he focuses on how the Court 
76. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong., Resolution and Report
of the Committee (1st Sess. 1866); see generally, Finkelman, Historical Context, supra note 1, at 400-
409.
77. NELSON, supra note 2, at 163. 
78. This process began with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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redeemed the property implications of the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
redemption (if we can call it that) led to the bizarre result that the Court 
protected the “liberty” to own and use private property and the “liberty” of 
the right of contract—even when it harmed the least powerful in the na-
tion—but would not protect other liberties that were more fundamental to a 
democracy, such as freedom of speech, press, religion, or the right to a fair 
trial.79
The question that Nelson fails to address is why Miller took the posi-
tion he did. The answer cannot come from traditional constitutional analy-
sis. Rather, it must come from the political context of the case. The 
plaintiffs in Slaughterhouse were almost entirely Confederate veterans. 
They were challenging a law passed by a Unionist, Republican legislature 
that included some black members. The political stakes of the case were 
high. If the butchers had won, Slaughterhouse might have undermined 
Republican hegemony in the South, destroying Reconstruction and giving 
the Confederate veterans a victory in Court that they had failed to win on 
the battlefield.
The political background of the case was highlighted by the back-
ground of the lawyer for the butchers, John Archibald Campbell. Before the 
Civil War, Campbell, a slaveholder from Alabama, had been a member of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and the author of a pro-slavery concurrence in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford.80 When the War began, he was the only member of 
the Supreme Court to resign his position and join the Confederacy. Two 
other Justices who came from Confederate states, James Wayne of Georgia 
and John Catron of Tennessee, remained on the bench. Not only did Camp-
bell leave the Court and return to Alabama, but he then became Assistant 
Secretary of War in the administration of Jefferson Davis, holding that 
position until the War ended. As the number-two man in the Confederate 
Department of War, he in effect actively made war on the United States. As 
Assistant Secretary of War, he was involved in the decisions of the Con-
federate government, articulated by his immediate superior Secretary of 
War James Seddon, to refuse to exchange black prisoners-of-war.81 Under 
his watch, the Confederate government enslaved captured black soldiers in 
violation of accepted and well-recognized rules of modern, civilized war-
79. See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
80. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 493. None of the judges who decided that case were still on the Court 
at this time. 
81. As part of the inner circle of the Department of War, Campbell was doubtless part of the 
decision making process and as Assistant Secretary of War he helped carry out these illegal policies. 
His complicity in such policies was clear, even if he offered the traditional defense of war criminals that 
he was “only carrying out orders.”
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fare.82 Campbell opposed emancipation, civil rights for blacks, and black 
citizenship. He was one of three Confederate officials who met with Lin-
coln at Hampton Roads in 1865 to seek a negotiated peace. These negotia-
tions failed in part because Campbell, like the other two Confederate 
officials, refused to accept emancipation. By any logical standard, Camp-
bell was a traitor, and by modern standards, a war criminal for his partici-
pation in the enslavement of captured troops and for failing to investigate 
the cold-blooded murder of surrendering U.S. Army troops by Confeder-
ates at Fort Pillow and elsewhere.83 Campbell had spent four years doing 
everything he could to ensure the death of United States soldiers as part of 
the rebellion designed to destroy the United States.84 He was an unrepent-
ant secessionist, and a racist former slave-owner.
Campbell’s appearance before the Court was an excellent move from 
the perspective of those who wanted to derail Reconstruction and the new 
amendments.85 Campbell brilliantly pushed the Court into what became a 
no-win situation for those who favored an egalitarian reconstruction of the 
former slave states. He successfully manipulated the Court majority into 
concluding that the only way to preserve Reconstruction in Louisiana was 
to dramatically limit the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miller and a 
narrow majority of the Court were lured into Campbell’s trap. Miller tried 
to avoid that trap by claiming that the only purpose of the Amendment was 
to protect the former slaves. Thus, much of Miller’s opinion is persuasively 
antislavery. But, as Nelson notes, this tactic was a jurisprudential disaster 
that ignored the history of the Amendment itself. Miller compounded the 
disaster by refusing to give a broad libertarian interpretation of the 
Amendment, as Justices Joseph P. Bradley and Stephen J. Field wanted to 
do. Thus, Miller cut the heart out of the Amendment, and eviscerated the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause because he thought it was the only way 
he could rule against the butchers.86 Alternatively, Miller could have easily 
concluded that the Louisiana law was constitutionally permissible as a pub-
lic health measure under traditional state police powers, thus mostly duck-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment questions.




85. Michael A. Ross, Obstructing Reconstruction: John Archibald Campbell and the Legal 
Campaign Against Louisiana’s Republican Government, 1868-1873, 49 CIVILWAR HIST. 235 (2003) 
[hereinafter Ross, Obstructing Reconstruction]; see also ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS, supra
note 69.
86. Ross, Obstructing Reconstruction, supra note 85; ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS,
supra note 69.
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But Miller did not figure this out. Campbell simply outsmarted Mil-
ler.87 As a former physician, Miller wanted to uphold the central slaughter-
house as a public health measure. And as a Republican, he supported 
Reconstruction. So, he ruled against the butchers, but in the process he also 
ruled against the Fourteenth Amendment. In the end, Campbell was the big 
winner. His narrow class of clients—the butchers—lost. But his broader set 
of clients—the former Confederates of the South—won a huge victory. 
Politics, not law, decided the case, and the traitorous former Confederate 
Assistant Secretary of War reversed in the courtroom some of what his 
troops had lost on the battlefield.
IV. THE DESTRUCTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE POST-RECONSTRUCTION 
COURT
Having weakened the power of the federal courts and Congress to pro-
tect civil liberties through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—in complete derogation of the goals of those who 
wrote, passed, and ratified it—the Supreme Court applied the same per-
verse logic to the Amendment’s civil rights provisions. The Court also 
undermined the Equal Protection Clause of the new Amendment, which 
proclaimed that the states could not deny anyone within their jurisdiction 
the “equal protection of the laws.” The authors of this clause assumed it 
would lead to basic racial equality in the nation and give blacks the same 
rights as whites, but the Court made a mockery of the clause and these 
expectations.88
Nelson demonstrates that the framers and ratifiers had no specific 
agreement on what the substance of equality might mean in all circum-
stances under the new amendment. But the impetus for the Amendment 
came from politicians such as John A. Bingham of Ohio, Thaddeus Stevens 
of Pennsylvania, Jacob Howard of Michigan, and Charles Sumner of Mas-
sachusetts, who had a long history of activism against slavery and in favor 
of racial equality.89 The first sentence of Section 1 of the Amendment, 
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State where-
in they reside,”90 emphatically overturned Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s 
87. Id.
88. NELSON, supra note 2, at 71-80 (discussing the antislavery arguments and theories that the 
proponents of the Amendment made); see also Paul Finkelman, Historical Context, supra note 1; Paul 
Finkelman, John Bingham, supra note 1, at 671-692 (2003); Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, supra note 1.
89. Id.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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conclusion in Dred Scott v. Sandford that blacks, even if free, could never 
be citizens of the United States91 and that states were free to deny them 
citizenship as well.92
The history of this sentence has important implications for modern 
politics and law. It is the reason why all children born in the United States 
are citizens of the nation (unless their parents are in the United States on 
diplomatic passports).93 This sentence includes the children of aliens, 
whether they are documented or not. Thus, birthright citizenship under the 
Fourteenth Amendment flows from being born in the nation and not from 
the status of one’s parents.94 Some people misunderstand the phrase “sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof,” to mean that American-born children of 
undocumented aliens are not citizens of the United States because their 
parents are not here legally and thus not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the 
United States. This sort of argument is doubly wrong. First, it is clear that 
aliens, whether documented or not, can be tried in American courts, incar-
cerated in American jails, must pay taxes to the states and the national gov-
ernment, and in a variety of other ways are “subject to the jurisdiction” of 
the United States.95 Second, the phrase “not subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof” refers solely to diplomats who have diplomatic immunity from all 
American law and thus cannot be tried in an American court without the 
consent of their home country. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, children 
of aliens in the United States are entitled to citizenship if born here, even if 
their parents are not legally able to become naturalized citizens.96 Moreo-
ver, all persons in the nation, whatever their immigration status, are entitled 
to the equal protection of the laws.97 Thus, immigrant children, as well as 
the American-born children of immigrants, have access to public schools.98
The citizenship clause meant more than just declaring that African-
Americans were citizens and had the right to sue in diversity in federal 
91. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
92. Paul Finkelman, Was Dred Scott Correctly Decided? An “Expert Report” For the Defendant,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219, 1231 (2008).
93. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
94. In many countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, and Japan, citizenship flows from the 
status of the parents (or the father) and not from the place of birth. Thus there are millions of people of 
Turkish ancestry born in Germany who are not citizens of Germany. Some American Indian nations 
also have citizenship based on the tribal citizenship of the father, rather than on where a child was born. 
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
95. The United States can also alter their immigration status by statute or court decision, give 
them asylum, give them amnesty for any legal violations connected to their entry into the nation, or 
deport such persons. 
96. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
97. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982).
98. Id. at 230.
2014] ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1039
court—reversing Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s holding in Dred Scott.
Many northerners understood that “citizenship” implied a set of substantive 
rights, including the right to franchise, the right to hold federal office, and 
the right to participate fully in the political process. When the southern 
states refused to enfranchise blacks after the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress passed, and the states ratified, the Fifteenth 
Amendment to prohibit racial discrimination in voting on the basis of 
“race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”99
Northerners also understood that citizenship included the right to a 
passport,100 a claim to protection by the government, and other rights, 
which today we generally call “civil liberties.”101 Thus, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s second sentence begins by providing that “[n]o State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States.”102 As Nelson demonstrates in his discus-
sion of the debates over the Amendment, at a minimum this clause was 
designed to prevent the states from overriding most of the liberties protect-
ed by the Bill of Rights.103 The rest of Section 1 unambiguously applied to 
everyone in the United States, not just to citizens. In a nation filled with 
immigrants this protection mattered a great deal. Thus, the second and third 
clauses of the second sentence of Section 1 applied explicitly to “persons” 
and not just citizens: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”104
Northerners may have assumed that there would be some social dis-
crimination in the South after the War, but that it would not be based on 
99. U.S. CONST., amend. XV. For elaboration of these issues, see HAROLD M. HYMAN AND 
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1835-1875
(1982 ) and RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH,
WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 112-116 (1993).
100. Before the Civil War, blacks were generally not allowed to have passports. 
101. Most scholars, including Nelson, agree that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
lieved that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would make most of the 
Bill of Rights applicable to the states. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1987).
102. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
103. The Supreme Court of course reached a very different conclusion in The Slaughterhouse 
Cases, This clause is linguistically ambiguous. It could be read to prohibit the states from passing any 
laws which denied federal privileges and immunities to U.S. citizens, and thus allowed the states to 
deny such rights to aliens. Such a reading would mean that the states could, for example, abridge the 
religious free exercise rights of aliens (even those legally resident in the nation) but not abridge those 
rights for U.S. Citizens. This interpretation would conflict with the equal protection clause, found in the 
same sentence of the 14th Amendment, which prohibits the states from denying “any person” (without 
regard to citizenship) the “equal protection of the laws.” Alternatively—and I would argue more proper-
ly—the clause bars the states from passing any laws which abridge federal privileges and immunities.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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law and that it would not lead to an oppressive system of segregation and 
disfranchisement. They believed, as Representative Samuel Shellabarger of 
Ohio thought, that the Equal Protection clause would ensure that “whatever 
rights . . . the States may confer upon one race or color of the citizens shall 
be held by all races in equality.”105 While there was some legal discrimina-
tion in the North in the 1860’s, like segregated schools in some places, 
there was also a substantial growth of civil rights protection taking place. 
For example, well before the Civil War, Ohio had repealed most of its dis-
criminatory legislation;106 in 1855, Massachusetts required that all public 
schools be integrated;107 and in many other places, schools were integrated 
under local options.108 During the Civil War, California and Oregon re-
pealed their bans on blacks testifying against whites,109 and Congress re-
quired that street-car franchises in the District of Columbia treat all 
passengers the same, without regard to race.110 Before the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, the Iowa Supreme Court declared that segregat-
ed schools violated the state constitution,111 and in a series of subsequent 
cases, the Iowa court reiterated that segregated schools violated the state 
constitution.112
Thus, whatever the specifics of equal protection meant, those who 
wrote and supported the Amendment—those who collectively added the 
Amendment to the Constitution—believed that it would move the nation 
closer to racial equality and provide substantial protection for blacks. The 
passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866113 and 1875,114 and a number of 
other pieces of civil rights legislation between 1866 and 1875, illustrate the 
105. NELSON, supra note 2, at 124 (quoting Representative Samuel Shellabarger).
106. Paul Finkelman, The Strange Career of Race Discrimination in Antebellum Ohio, 55 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 373-408 (2004).
107. An Act to Protect the Rights and Liberties of the People of the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, ch. 489, 1855 Mass. Acts 924.
108. Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 427-30.
109. Practice Act, Title XI of Witnesses and of the Matter of Attaining Evidence, GENERAL LAWS
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FROM 1855–1864 INCLUSIVE 769 (1865); CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
AND OTHER GENERAL STATUTES OF OREGON ENACTED IN 1862, at 174-75 (1863). Significantly, these 
laws did not give such rights to Chinese immigrants or their American-born children. See Finkelman, 
Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 422, 425.
110. Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 536 (1865) (amending an Act entitled “An Act to Incorporate 
the Metropolitan Railroad Company in the District of Columbia”).
111. Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868).
112. Cited in NELSON, supra note 2, at 151-52. The Iowa court also applied this reasoning to issue 
of transportation. See Coger v. N.W. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145 (1873) (upholding a judgment 
against a steamboat for discriminating against a black passenger).
113. Civil Rights Act of 1866, (Act of April 9, 1866), 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
114. Civil Rights Act of 1875, (Act of March 1, 1875), 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
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intentions of those who led the fight for the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
well as the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.115
Despite this history, the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and ear-
ly twentieth centuries did not interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to pro-
tect black civil rights. Nor would the Court use the Amendment to protect 
the civil liberties of white Unionists, black and white U.S. Army veterans, 
or anyone else in the former Confederacy.
Nelson’s analysis of the segregation and race discrimination cases, 
which comes at the end of his book, is narrowly legalistic, as he parses 
decisions without interrogating their purpose, trajectory, or outcome. He 
does not endorse the outcomes in these cases—he is no neo-Confederate or 
apologist for segregation. But, I think Nelson is overly kind to many of the 
late nineteenth century Justices, when analyzing and explaining their deci-
sions on race and equality. In discussing these issues, his book is so legalis-
tic that it becomes disconnected from history, politics, and the actual results 
of these cases. His discussion also ignores the blatant hypocrisy—the intel-
lectual dishonesty—of the Court in this period. Thus, while Nelson accu-
rately explains these cases on their own terms, he does not explore beneath 
their surface.
Nelson observes, for example, that in Ex parte Virginia,116 the Court 
showed it “was prepared to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s core 
principle of equality even when a state judge, without statutory discretion,
acted in a racially discriminatory fashion.”117 In this case, J.D. Coles, a 
Virginia state judge refused to allow blacks to serve on a jury and the Su-
preme Court upheld a federal prosecution of the judge for this act. Nelson, 
in a legalistic manner, notes that “Ex parte Virginia constituted an im-
portant extension of previous Fourteenth Amendment cases because it in-
volved discriminatory practice that was being carried on under a statute that 
was racially neutral on its face.”118 This analysis is entirely true, and Nel-
son rightly praises the case for being an extraordinary example of judicial 
opposition to blatant discrimination. However, Nelson never tells us that 
this was the last time the Court so acted, and that in virtually all subsequent 
cases, the Court refused to interfere with discriminatory actions or legisla-
tion.
115. See HAROLD M. HYMAN AND WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1835-1875 (1982).
116. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
117. NELSON, supra note 2, at 183.
118. Id. 
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Nelson might have profitably compared the case involving Judge 
Coles with Virginia v. Rives,119 decided in the same term. In Rives, the 
Court refused to allow two black teenagers convicted of murder to remove 
their case to federal court, where they were more likely to get a fair trial. 
No blacks had ever served on a grand jury or petit jury in the history of the 
county.120
The two black teenagers argued
that a strong prejudice existed in the community of the county against 
them, independent of the merits of the case and based solely upon the 
facts that they are negroes and that the man they were accused of having 
murdered was a white man. From that fact alone, they were satisfied they 
could not obtain an impartial trial before a jury exclusively composed of 
the white race. The petitioners further represented that their race had 
never been allowed the right to serve as jurors, either in civil or criminal 
cases, in the County of Patrick, in any case, civil or criminal, in which 
their race had been in any way interested.121
Their argument persuaded U.S. District Judge Alexander Rives to re-
move the case to federal court. The Supreme Court overruled Judge Rives, 
declaring that the federal removal statutes, designed precisely to protect 
against the kind of discrimination the two black teenagers faced could not 
be used in this way. One of the most important scholars of this issue has 
noted, “Justice Strong’s construction of the removal jurisdiction was sim-
plistic. It may well have had a disastrous effect on race relations for more 
than a half-century by closing federal trial courts to proof of jury discrimi-
nation.”122
These two Virginia cases, decided the same day, illustrate the cynical 
hypocrisy and narrow jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century Supreme 
Court. Judge Coles, and other southern state judges might have faced pros-
ecution and even jail for discrimination in choosing juries (although there is 
no evidence suggesting that any other southern judge was prosecuted for 
such discrimination), but the black victims of such discrimination whose 
fate was at stake in Virginia v. Rives could find no justice from the Su-
preme Court and would later be hanged after being denied due process of 
law and equal protection of the laws.123
119. 100 U.S. 313 (1879). This case is also sometimes cited as Ex parte Virginia, but is usually 
referred to as Virginia v. Rives to avoid confusion with the case of Ex parte Virginia which involved 
Judge Coles.
120. Id. at 315.
121. Id.
122. Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 1401, 1434 (1983). 
123. Id. at 1433-34.
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Nelson might also have looked at the final jury cases from this period, 
which reveals the racism of the Court and its utter refusal to face the social 
and political realities of the emerging horror story of race relations in the 
post-Reconstruction South. In three jury cases from Mississippi during the 
1890’s, the Court ignored the blatant and unrestrained racism of segrega-
tion and its lethal consequences.124
The Mississippi Constitution of 1890 was explicitly designed to elimi-
nate black voting. It 1960 scholars in Mississippi admitted that its “pattern 
of restrictive requirements” for voting was “more extensive than that of any 
of the other 49 states.”125 Known as the “disfranchisement Constitution,” it 
was remarkably effective. As Benno Schmidt noted,
[t]he new [1890] state constitution imposed a variety of suffrage qualifi-
cations designed to disfranchise blacks. Some, like the poll tax, tended to 
exclude many blacks automatically; others, like the literacy test and the 
requirement to “be able to read and write any section of the Constitution 
of this State and give a reasonable interpretation thereof to the county 
registrar,” or the requirement to demonstrate “a reasonable understand-
ing of the duties and obligations of citizenship,” transparently invited in-
vidious manipulation.126
Because jury selection was tied to voter registration, the Constitution 
had the effect of eliminating virtually all black jurors from the state. “Jury 
selection in Mississippi was thus open-ended discretion resting on voter 
rolls that reflected increasingly systematic eradication of black voting.”127
Williams v. Mississippi challenged this situation on behalf of Henry Wil-
liams, a black man facing execution after being indicted by an all-white 
grand jury and being convicted by an all-white petit jury.128
The Court rejected Williams’s claims of discrimination even while 
quoting from a Mississippi case which openly declared that the purpose of 
the 1890 state constitution was to discriminate against blacks.129 The Su-
preme Court quoted Mississippi’s highest Court, which declared that 
“[w]ithin the field of permissible action under the limitations imposed by 
the federal constitution, the convention swept the field of expedients, to 
obstruct the exercise of suffrage by the negro race.”“130 The U.S. Supreme 
124. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896); 
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). A fourth case from Louisiana led to the same result. 
Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896).
125. YESTERDAY’S CONSTITUTION TODAY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 
1890, at 98 (Edward H. Hobbs ed., 1960).
126. Schmidt, Jr., supra note 122, at 1462.
127. Id.
128. Williams, 170 U.S. at 213-14.
129. Id. at 214-15.
130. Id. at 222 (quoting Ratliff v. Beale, 20 South 865, 868 (Miss. 1896)).
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Court might have read this passage and concluded that Mississippi’s consti-
tution and laws violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. But the 
Court did not see any constitutional problems with a state that openly de-
clared its laws were designed to disfranchise black voters.131 Nor was the 
Court concerned with the assertion of Mississippi’s justices that
[b]y reason of its previous condition of servitude and dependencies, this 
race had acquired or accentuated certain peculiarities of habit, of temper-
ament, and of character which clearly distinguished it as a race from the 
whites; a patient, docile people, but careless, landless, migratory within 
narrow limits, without forethought, and its criminal members given to 
furtive offenses, rather than the robust crimes of the whites. Restrained 
by the federal Constitution from discriminating against the negro race, 
the convention discriminates against its characteristics, and the offenses 
to which its criminal members are prone.132
Rather than expressing any concern that Mississippi’s actions might 
have been based on racism and a conscious desire to violate the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments, Justice Joseph McKenna, writing for the ma-
jority, determined that
nothing tangible can be deduced from this. If weakness were to be taken 
advantage of, it was to be done “within the field of permissible action 
under the limitations imposed by the federal Constitution,” and the 
means of it were the alleged characteristics of the negro race, not the 
administration of the law by officers of the state.133
Astoundingly, the Court concluded that “[i]t cannot be said, therefore, 
that the denial of the equal protection of the laws arises primarily from the 
constitution and laws of Mississippi; nor is there any sufficient allegation 
of an evil and discriminating administration of them.”134
We must see the Williams decision in the context of Nelson’s analysis 
of Plessy v. Ferguson,135 decided two years earlier. Nelson argues that Jus-
tice Henry B. Brown’s majority opinion in Plessy, was “not racist in tone; 
rather it was legalistic in style.”136 Certainly, Justice Brown avoided the 
over-the-top racism of some nineteenth century jurists.137 And his opinion 
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Ratliff, 20 South at 868). 
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
136. NELSON, supra note 2, at 185.
137. Consider Justice William L. Harris’s outburst in Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 264 (1859), 
holding that a woman who had been born a slave but legally freed by her owner (who was also her 
father) could not receive a legacy given to her in her father’s will. Harris wrote: “Suppose that Ohio, 
still further afflicted with her peculiar philanthropy, should determine to descend another grade in the 
scale of her peculiar humanity, and claim to confer citizenship on the chimpanzee or the ourang-outang 
(the most respectable of the monkey tribe), are we to be told that ‘comity’ will require of the States not 
thus demented, to forget their own policy and self-respect, and lower their own citizens and institutions 
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is hardly racist in tone compared to the grotesquely racist quotations from
the Mississippi court which Justice McKenna used in upholding the total 
disfranchisement of blacks in Mississippi. But the outcome of Plessy was
racist, as were its implications and underpinnings.
Nelson’s narrowly legalistic analysis of Plessy notes that Justice 
Brown compared segregation on trains—the issue in Plessy—to segregation 
in public schools.138 Nelson correctly observes that Justice Brown noted 
that courts had accepted segregated schools since Roberts v. City of Bos-
ton,139 when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld segregated 
schools in Boston. Nelson certainly does not seek “to provide a justification 
for Plessy”140 or for that matter to “cast doubt on the holding”141 of Brown
v. Board of Education.142 Rather, Nelson argues:
The point . . . is that the Plessy court acted in much the same fashion as 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. When confronted with com-
peting claims of principle, each having strong support among different 
segments of society, the men of both institutions compromised, made 
concessions to both points of view, and left ultimate issues unre-
solved.143
In effect, Nelson seems to be saying that Plessy and other cases like Wil-
liams v. Mississippi were correct when they were decided and that Brown 
was correct when it was decided.144 But, was this really true for Plessy?145
Justice Brown based much of his decision in Plessy on the opinion of 
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
Roberts v. City of Boston.146 Chief Justice Shaw was arguably the most 
influential antebellum state judge in the nation.147 Justice Brown, who was 
in the scale of being, to meet the necessities of the mongrel race thus attempted to be introduced into the 
family of sisters in this confederacy.” Id. at 264. 
138. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45.
139. 59 Mass. 198 (1850).
140. NELSON, supra note 2, at 187.
141. Id.
142. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143. NELSON, supra note 2, at 187.
144. Id. I should add that this is a conclusion that Nelson privately shared with me at the time his 
book came out.
145. One curiosity of Plessy is that it cannot be squared with earlier decisions, unless the squaring 
is purely on racist grounds. In Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 485 (1877) and Louisville, New Orleans 
& Texas Railway v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890) the Court struck down southern state statutes that 
required integration in public transportation. If a state could not require integration (which would seem 
to be consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment) it is hard to understand how logically the state could 
require segregation. The Court used commerce clause analysis to strike down the integrationist laws, 
but this in reality seems pretextual to reach a segregationist outcome.
146. 59 Mass. 198 (1850).
147. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW
(1957); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION (1976) (3d ed. 2007).
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also from Massachusetts, seemed to be saying that if the venerable Chief 
Justice Shaw approved of segregation, it must be constitutionally permissi-
ble. But, such a conclusion was fundamentally at odds with the legal histo-
ry of Massachusetts as well as with the history of the framing of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Brown’s use of Roberts failed to take into account a significant 
amount of history and legal change that had taken place since 1850. Chief 
Justice Shaw decided Roberts in 1850 when more than ninety-seven per-
cent of all blacks lived in the South and more than ninety-five percent of 
them were slaves. At that time, slavery was legal in half the states in the 
nation, and protected in numerous ways by the U.S. Constitution.148 Fur-
thermore, and this is critical, at the time the Massachusetts court decided 
Roberts, there were no Constitutional amendments protecting civil rights or 
guaranteeing equal protection of the law. The states were free to treat their 
citizens as they wished, emancipating them or enslaving them, segregating 
them or giving them equality, without any interference from the national 
government. Thus, Shaw could act completely under state law, and con-
clude as he did, that nothing in the Massachusetts Constitution or the Mas-
sachusetts statutes prohibited Boston from choosing to segregate blacks in 
its public schools.
In the four and a half decades since Chief Justice Shaw had allowed 
segregation in Roberts, more than 650,000 Americans had died in a war 
that ended slavery and more than 200,000 black soldiers and sailors had 
fought to preserve the nation and to end slavery. Congress had passed a 
myriad of major civil rights laws and many minor laws, such as the District 
of Columbia law banning segregation on street-cars,149 all pointing to a 
national determination to protect the civil rights of blacks and to create 
substantive equality. The Constitution had been amended three times to 
create and protect black freedom and racial equality. In his reliance on the 
Roberts case, Justice Brown seemed oblivious to all these changes.
Justice Brown might have used Roberts to reach a very different con-
clusion. The chief attorney arguing for equality in Roberts was the young 
Boston reformer Charles Sumner.150 A year after Shaw’s decision, the 
Massachusetts legislature elected Sumner to the United States Senate, 
where, for more than two decades, he was one of the nation’s most con-
sistent and articulate supporters of racial equality. He was a prime mover in 
148. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF 
JEFFERSON (3d ed. 2014).
149. See Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 536 (1865).
150. See generally DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER (1996).
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Congress’s adoption of the three Civil War Amendments that ended slavery 
and created constitutional protections for black liberty.151 He was the au-
thor of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which Congress passed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment shortly after Sumner’s death as a tribute to the late 
voice for liberty. That act prohibited segregation in street-cars and other 
modes of public transportation. The Supreme Court struck down that law in 
the Civil Rights Cases,152 over the vigorous dissent of Justice John Mar-
shall Harlan,153 who also dissented in Plessy. In the Civil Rights Cases, the 
Court held that Congress lacked the power to regulate private behavior 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, which the majority of the Justices said 
regulated only state action, even though the Congress in 1875 (which in-
cluded many Representatives and Senators who had voted for the Four-
teenth Amendment a decade earlier) believed the law was constitutional 
under the new Amendment. But in Plessy, the issue before the Court was
precisely one of state action. Justice Brown might easily have concluded 
that the key to understanding the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was not a decision written by a Massachusetts jurist who died before the 
Civil War began, but to the lawyer who lost the 1850 case and then dedi-
cated the next two and a half decades of his life to successfully reversing 
that precedent at the state and federal level.
Justice Brown also might have considered the history of segregation in 
Massachusetts after the Roberts case. A group of black activists in Boston 
who resented that their children were forced to attend a segregated school, 
when there were other schools closer to where they lived, filed the lawsuit. 
At the time, Boston was the only community in Massachusetts with segre-
gated schools. The black community in Boston did not abandon its quest 
for school equality after Roberts. On the contrary, blacks in Boston redou-
bled their efforts to eliminate segregated schools. A boycott “reduced black 
[school] attendance dramatically.”154 Blacks “who could afford to establish 
residence outside the city did so, taking advantage of integrated schools in 
several of the towns outside Boston.”155 Meanwhile, blacks, who could 
vote in Massachusetts, petitioned the state legislature to prohibit segregated 
schools throughout the state.156 These petitions were successful in 1855, 
151. See generally id.
152. United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
153. Id. at 26-62.
154. JAMES O. HORTON & LOIS HORTON, BLACK BOSTONIANS: FAMILY LIFE AND COMMUNITY 
STRUGGLE IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH 74 (1979).
155. Id. at 74-75.
156. Id. at 75.
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when the state legislature prohibited segregation in the Commonwealth’s 
public schools.157
Thus, Justice Brown might have concluded that the force of history 
was against segregation. The state legislature had elected the losing attor-
ney in Roberts to the United States Senate the following year,158 which was 
in part a political rejection of Shaw’s opinion. Five years later, Massachu-
setts emphatically rejected Shaw’s decision, with new legislation that the 
governor signed which prohibited segregations in the Commonwealth’s 
schools. In the next fifteen years, the nation had rejected slavery and racism 
in a bloody and expensive war, followed by three constitutional amend-
ments writing the results of that war into the Constitution. During this peri-
od, Congress passed numerous laws, which unambiguously demonstrated 
that the will of the nation was moving towards more equality and integra-
tion, even if it did not fully endorse all forms of social equality.
The Louisiana law at issue in Plessy was enacted by the very people, 
or their children, who had traitorously tried to destroy the nation by ruptur-
ing the nation. They had seceded in the service of slavery and then made 
war on the nation.159 They had lost that war, and Brown might have con-
cluded they should not win the peace through laws that harmed the only 
group of people and their descendants in Louisiana who were truly loyal to 
the United States during the War.
That Justice Brown and the Court did not choose this direction—
indeed the Court had been moving away from this direction since Slaugh-
terhouse—was not because the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers were 
uncertain about the general direction of their public policy. It was not, as 
Nelson argues, because the Court was “confronted with competing claims 
of principle.”160 Rather it was because the Justices turned their backs on the 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the fundamental liberties 
of the former slaves and free blacks in the South, their descendants, and 
their white and black allies from the North.
Nelson demonstrates that there was enough complexity in the debates 
over the Fourteenth Amendment for differing views about what equal pro-
tection or due process meant. But no one who voted for the Amendment, 
157. An Act Concerning Public Schools, ch. 214, 1855 Mass. Act 358; see also LEONARD W.
LEVY AND DOUGLAS JONES, JIM CROW IN BOSTON: THE ORIGIN OF THE SEPARATE BUT EQUAL 
DOCTRINE (1974).
158. Before the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, Senators were elected by the 
state legislatures and not by a direct vote of the people.
159. On the proslavery basis for secession, see Paul Finkelman, States’ Rights, Southern Hypocri-
sy, and the Crisis of the Union, 45 AKRON L. REV. 449 (2012).
160. NELSON, supra note 2, at 187.
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and the Fifteenth that followed it, and the many civil rights acts of the peri-
od could have believed these Constitutional and legal changes meant that it 
was permissible to deny blacks the right to vote, hold office, serve on ju-
ries, or sit where they pleased on public transportation. The members of 
Congress who voted to integrate Washington’s public transportation, and a 
year later passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, would have been stunned to learn that, three decades later, the Su-
preme Court would conclude that nothing that they did was meant to give 
blacks a right to equal protection of the laws or due process in the courts. 
They would have been shocked to learn that the Supreme Court had, in
effect, rewritten their amendments to protect private property, emerging 
corporations, and southern white supremacists, but not to protect the civil 
rights of African Americans.
One way to understand the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment—
and where the late nineteenth century Court went wrong—is to return to the 
background of the Amendment. The Amendment grew out of investiga-
tions into the conditions in the South in the aftermath of the Civil War. To 
the great shock of northerners, defeated Confederates did not simply lay 
down their arms, accept the end of slavery, and move forward towards 
reconstructing the former Confederate states on a biracial and egalitarian 
basis.161 Instead, the nation witnessed massive violence in the South di-
rected at blacks, U.S. army soldiers, white southern unionists, and northern 
whites who had moved to the South after the War.162 Newly elected south-
ern state legislatures passed numerous laws, collectively known as black 
codes, which were designed prevent black political activity and economic 
success. Across the defeated Confederacy new local and state governments 
and white terrorists did everything they could to reverse the outcome of the 
Civil War.163
161. For a brief discussion of the legal and constitutional background to these events, see 1 
MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 490-504 (3d ed. 2011); see generally, JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION 
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (3d ed. 2012); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (2002).
162. Illustrative of the nature of southern violence was package that Senator Charles Sumner 
received in the spring while Congress was debated the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Senator Charles 
Sumner of Massachusetts received a box containing the finger of a black man. The accompanying note 
read: “You old son of a bitch, I send you a piece of one of your friends, and if that bill of yours passes I 
will have a piece of you.” JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND 
THE NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 341 (1964).
163. See 1 UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY, supra note 161, at 490-504; see
generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (3d ed. 2012); FONER,
supra note 161.
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In response to these developments, in December 1865, Congress 
formed the Joint Committee on Reconstruction to investigate conditions in 
the South. This committee’s report led to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
the Fourteenth Amendment. During these hearings, Brevet Major General 
John W. Turner of the United States Army testified about conditions in 
Virginia. He noted that in Virginia, where the Confederacy had its capital, 
“all of the [white] people” were “extremely reluctant to grant to the negro 
his civil rights – those privileges that pertain to freedom, the protection of 
life, liberty, and property before the laws, the right to testify in courts, 
etc.”164 Turner noted that whites were “reluctant even to consider and treat 
the negro as a free man, to let him have his half of the sidewalk or the street 
crossing.”165 They would only “concede” such rights to blacks “if it is ever 
done, because they are forced to do it.”166 Testimony like that offered by 
Turner led to the Fourteenth Amendment, and this is where the Court 
should have turned to understand the Amendment.167 This kind of evidence 
illustrates why a narrow analysis of the Court’s race opinions in the late 
nineteenth century fails to teach what was actually happening when the 
Amendment was written and why the Court’s interpretations of the 
Amendment were so horrendously off the mark.
V. THE BETRAYAL OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NATION
Parsing the race cases of the late nineteenth century without examin-
ing the social and political context of the cases, as Nelson does, leads to the 
erroneous conclusion that the Court acted moderately and carefully within 
well-understood rules of law. Nelson suggests that the Court was making 
compromises and “concessions to both points of view” at the time.168 How-
ever, he never suggests what those compromises were or what concessions 
were made to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment who believed that 
they were protecting fundamental rights of blacks.
One might wonder how the Court incorporated the “point of view” of
blacks, unless it was in the dissents of Justice John Marshall Harlan. Where 
was the “balance” in failing to protect black civil rights, voting rights, or 
their right to be jurors? What “concessions” did the Court ask from the 
segregating South? What compromise was reached over black rights? Were 
164. REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. Rep. 39-30, pt. II, at 4 (testimony 
of Brevet Major General John W. Turner).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See NELSON, supra note 2, at 48-60.
168. Id. at 187.
2014] ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1051
there any concessions to due process in the series of decisions that removed 
virtually all southern blacks from jury boxes and voting booths?
The Court did not ask the white South to make any concessions when 
the Supreme Court upheld laws that segregated blacks, barred middle-class 
blacks from riding in first class cars with their white counterparts, or pre-
vented black women from riding in the “women’s cars” of trains. Were 
there concessions and compromises that created grammar schools for 
blacks while creating high schools for whites?169 The only rational conclu-
sion, when looking at these cases, is that the Court was uninterested in the 
rights of blacks, had forgotten what the Civil War was all about, and had no 
interest whatsoever in why the Fourteenth Amendment was written and 
ratified.
Two cases—Lochner v. New York170 and Berea College v. Ken-
tucky,171—decided within a few years of each other, just after the turn-of-
the-century, illustrate the problematic nature of arguing that there was any 
sort of balance in the Court’s race jurisprudence in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Lochner demonstrates how the Court was perfectly comfortable re-
jecting majoritarian state legislation that did not comport with its economic 
theories, while Berea College demonstrates the Court’s willingness to 
abandon its economic theories in support of state laws which denied equali-
ty to blacks. These cases represent clear examples of the Court’s intellectu-
ally dishonest and morally bankrupt jurisprudence.
In 1905, in Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a New York 
law limiting the hours that a baker could work on the grounds that the law 
interfered with the baker’s “liberty of contract” under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.172 Three years later, in Berea College 
v. Kentucky, the Court upheld a Kentucky law that prevented Berea Col-
lege, a private institution of higher learning, from operating on an integrat-
ed basis.173 Counsel in Berea College argued that “[a]bsolute arbitrary 
power over the lives, liberties and property of the people cannot exist in 
this country, under any name or in any form, and it is always the duty of 
the courts to disregard mere names and forms in determining whether the 
legislature has or has not exceeded its authority.”174 Citing Lochner, the 
lawyers for Berea College argued that “[t]he statute is unnecessary and 
unreasonable, and therefore an arbitrary interference with the rights of the 
169. Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Ed., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
170. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
171. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
172. 198 U.S. at 64.
173. 211 U.S. at 57-58. 
174. 211 U.S. at 48.
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people in the conduct of their private business and in the pursuit of their 
ordinary occupations.” The attorney for the College acknowledged that the 
legislature could regulate property interests and economic liberty for nox-
ious commerce, such as that involving liquor, gambling, the “maintenance 
of nuisances, the keeping of disorderly houses,”175 and similar activities. 
But operating a college could not be considered such an enterprise, and the 
fact that it was integrated was irrelevant because the “Constitution makes 
no distinction between the different races or different classes of the peo-
ple.”176 In dissent, Justice John Marshall accepted these arguments, assert-
ing that the Kentucky statute was “an arbitrary invasion of the rights of 
liberty and property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against 
hostile state action and is, therefore, void.”177
The Court majority in Berea College rejected these arguments with a 
simplistic analysis that a state had a right to alter a corporate charter.178
Such a power did not exist, of course, if it was arbitrary or violated the 
United States Constitution. Three years earlier, in Lochner, the Court found 
that a state was arbitrary in prohibiting employers—including presumably 
corporate employers—from making bakers work more than sixty hours a 
week. But the Court found nothing arbitrary about forcing a private college 
that had long been integrated to segregate. And, the Court found nothing in 
the Constitution that prohibited states from passing legislation which forced 
private individuals and companies to practice segregation against their will. 
In the Civil Rights Cases, it is worth remembering, that the Court held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment only limited state action. But, here the Court 
found that state action requiring segregation, when both the blacks and the 
whites involved wanted integration, did not violate the equal protection or 
due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
One wonders what the “compromise” was when the Court that almost 
always protected the rights of private property, upheld this Kentucky law, 
which in effect undermined Berea College’s property rights and liberty of 
contract. It is virtually impossible to square the liberty of contract argu-
ments in Lochner with the outcome in Berea College. Surely, the trustees 
of Berea College had the right to contract with whoever they wanted to sell 
their product—a college education. Similarly the purchasers of this prod-
uct—the students—had a right to contract to buy the product. If whites and 
blacks chose to buy an education in an integrated context, the students 
175. Id. at 49.
176. Id. at 49.
177. Id. at 67.
178. Id. at 57.
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should have had such a right under Lochner. That they did not have such a 
right underscores the racial bias of the court in this period and its refusal to 
honestly interpret and enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Blacks and 
white integrationists did not apparently have freedom of contract.
Finally, Nelson suggests that the Court may have acted as it did be-
cause the Justices thought it was what the American people wanted. This 
argument assumes that the Justices in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries shaped their decision to comport with popular will.179 Nelson 
implies this by arguing that the race decisions in this period gave conces-
sions to both sides, when in fact they gave nothing to blacks. Tied to this 
conclusion is the implication that the Court was just following accepted 
rules and precedents. Such an analysis would lead to the conclusion that the 
Justices had no choice and that therefore, whatever we think of the deci-
sions in the Civil Rights Cases or in Plessy, they were the right decisions at 
the time. Nelson, for example argues that in its race jurisprudence “deferen-
tial judges . . . understood their obligation to accept legislative fact-
finding,” and thus upheld segregation as reasonable.180 Therefore, support-
ing segregation “might not have seemed outrageous in the context of the 
1890’s.”181
This analysis falls apart on close scrutiny. The Court of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century was notoriously never worried about 
being popular or “deferential” to the state legislatures or the national legis-
lature.182 Some of its decisions on antitrust183 were clearly unpopular and 
not deferential. Most Americans favored a graduated income tax. Twice 
Congress passed laws allowing it, but Nelson’s notion of “deference” did 
not stop the Court from striking down such laws, not once but twice.184
Underscoring the fundamental unpopularity of these decisions is the fram-
ing and adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.185 Lochner v. New 
York showed how little the Court deferred to the legislature of the nation’s 
largest state. The decision was one of the most unpopular decisions in the 
Court’s history, and scholars and politicians alike have ever since called the 
179. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
180. NELSON, supra note 2, at 186.
181. Id. at 186-187.
182. For a succinct discussion of the evolution of the law in this period, see 2 UROFSKY &
FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY, supra note 63, at 591-461.
183. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
184. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & 
Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
185. BERNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 117-122.
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court in this period “The Lochner Court.”186 Most Americans reacted with 
hostility to the Lochner Court’s decisions adversely affecting bans on child 
labor, limiting the rights of workers, and striking down numerous other 
popular state and federal laws. The succession of Progressive presidents—
Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson—
illustrated that the electorate favored progressive reforms, and not the reac-
tionary, narrow jurisprudence of the Lochner Court. But, the Court did not 
think it needed to worry about public opinion, nor did it. The Court in this 
period was rarely deferential to any legislature, state or federal. Thus, we 
cannot explain the Court’s support for segregation and racism on the 
grounds that it was deferential to the majority or to state legislatures.
It is also important to note that the Court was not particularly deferen-
tial to state or federal legislation that supported equality. Unfortunately, 
Nelson’s book does not consider this issue, which once again illustrates 
that the Court was not deferential to legislatures, and thus its race jurispru-
dence was not rooted in deference but was based on the animus the Court 
had to the rights of African Americans. Thus, over Justice Harlan’s dissent, 
the Court found the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional,187 without 
giving any deference to the national legislature. Two cases involving seg-
regation in public transportation after the court struck down the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 illustrate the hypocrisy and intellectual dishonesty of 
the Court in this period and demonstrates that when it came to race the 
Court did not make “concessions to both points of view,” but virtually al-
ways supported segregation. These two cases, Hall v. DeCuir and Louis-
ville, New Orleans, & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi are discussed in 
turn below.
During Reconstruction, the Louisiana legislature prohibited segrega-
tion on all public transport and in 1869 allowed aggrieved travelers a right 
of private action.188 Under this law, Josephine DeCuir successfully sued a 
steamboat that had refused to allow her to occupy a private room she had 
paid for, because she was black.189 At trial she was awarded $1,000 dollars 
in damages, but she lost her judgment in Hall v. DeCuir,190 where the Su-
preme Court held that the Louisiana law interfered with interstate com-
186. PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW 
YORK (1990); HOWARD GILMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LOCHNER EAR 
POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
187. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
188. Act of Feb. 23, 1869, No. 38, 1869 La. Acts 37 (“An Act to Enforce the Thirteenth Article of 
the Constitution of this State, and to Regulate the Licenses mentioned in the said thirteenth article”).
189. Decuir v. Benson. 27 La.Ann. 1, 2 (1875).
190. 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
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merce, since boats crossing into Louisiana from other states would have to 
allow black passengers to move to non-segregated sections of the ship, and 
when leaving Louisiana they might have to move black passengers as 
well.191 There was no deference here to Louisiana, which wanted to provide 
integration within its state boundaries. The bias of the Court was obvious. 
The Court would not allow Louisiana to mandate integration within its own 
boundaries, because other states might mandate segregation.192 The case 
implied that segregation trumped integration—this was hardly balanced.
The hypocrisy of the Court in this period and the failure to balance 
“both points of view” became clear a few years later in Louisville, New 
Orleans, & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi.193 This case involved a Mis-
sissippi law that required segregation on trains. The Louisville, New Orle-
ans, & Texas railroad brought suit because it did not want to go to the 
trouble and expense of having separate cars for blacks. Had the Court ap-
plied the logic of Hall v. DeCuir, the Court would have struck down the 
Mississippi law. This would have been a concession to “both points of 
view,” and would have left segregation or integration entirely in the hands 
of the railroad. But, that is not what happened. The Court upheld mandato-
ry segregation, and did not find that it placed a burden on interstate com-
merce, unlike the mandatory integration in DeCuir.
These two cases illustrate that there was no balancing by the Court on 
issues of race, and the “deference” in race cases was a one-way street. If 
the legislature sought to harm civil rights, the Court was deferential even 
when, as in Williams v. Mississippi, the racial animus of the state was na-
ked and completely out in the open. In his discussion of a Georgia school 
district that abolished its high school for blacks,194 Nelson asserted that the 
“courts were not racist” and that they “demanded that black children re-
ceive an equal education.”195 Here, the Court said it would side with the 
black plaintiffs if the school board’s motivation was “hostility to the col-
ored population because of their race.”196 But, the Court in this period nev-
er demanded that educational opportunity be equal and never questioned 
the motivations of segregationist actors. Indeed, after 1881 the Court would 
191. Id. at 497-98.
192. Id. at 498.
193. 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
194. Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Ed., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
195. NELSON, supra note 2, at 186. 
196. Id. (quoting Cumming, 175 U.S. at 545). It is possible to argue that this case was decided 
correctly, because the remedy the black plaintiffs requested—closing the white high school until a black 
school was opened—was inappropriate and beyond the power of the Court. But the case can hardly 
stand for the principle of equality except to the extent that the court in theory says it would strike down 
a law that was racially motivated to harm blacks.
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not side with black plaintiffs in a Fourteenth Amendment case until World 
War I,197 and the Court would not use the equal protection clause to protect 
black civil rights until the 1930’s.198
We cannot explain the Court’s race jurisprudence in this period on a 
theory of deference, nor will an appeal to the uncertainties of the Four-
teenth Amendment work. The appeal to history is unconvincing, since the 
major prop for this argument was an antebellum case, Roberts v. City of 
Boston, which had been long relegated to the dustbin of history by the state 
where it was decided. Racism may seem like too simplistic an explanation, 
and Nelson offers many alternatives. But to casually dismiss racism is 
wrong. The Court in this period demonstrated little interest in protecting 
the rights of blacks or preserving their liberties.
VI. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: THE CIVIL RIGHTS TRADITION IN THE NORTH
The implication of the narrowly legalistic analysis of the race cases is 
that they fit within the cultural preferences of the nation and thus the Court, 
which was otherwise never very deferential to the public, was in fact giving 
Americans what they wanted. This argument, however, is problematic.
It is not clear that the Court’s attack on black civil rights from Slaugh-
terhouse to Plessy and beyond, was necessarily popular throughout the 
nation. In 1883, the Court declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitu-
tional, because it affected individual actions, rather than state action.199 In 
dissent, Justice Harlan argued that public accommodations were traditional-
ly regulated under the common law and thus discrimination in hotels, res-
taurants, street-cars, theaters, and the like constituted a form of state 
action.200 In that year the Court also upheld an Alabama law criminalizing
interracial marriage, despite claims that this state law denied the parties to 
the marriage equal protection of the law.201
197. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (involving property rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and not the Equal Protection Clause). The court also supported two 
federal prosecutions under the Fifteenth Amendment in this period. See Ex parte Yarbrough (The Ku 
Klux Klan cases), 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (upholding prosecution of white terrorists who attacked black 
voters); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking down Oklahoma’s grandfather clause that 
allowed whites, but not blacks, to vote, even if they could not pass a literacy test).
198. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
199. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883).
200. Id.
201. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883). 
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Even the claim that these cases were “popular” is suspect. They were 
surely popular among most white Southerners.202 But, they were certainly 
not popular among blacks, the vast majority of whom lived in the South. 
Many white northerners also would have opposed these decisions, judging 
from the many civil rights laws passed by northern states in this period. 
Almost every northern state passed an equal accommodations law after the 
Civil Rights Cases struck down such protections at the federal level.203 In 
the same year that the Court upheld the criminalization of interracial mar-
riage in Alabama, Michigan legalized such marriages, despite the fact that 
most of the members of the legislature personally disapproved of such un-
ions.204 In 1899, three years after the Court in Plessy upheld railroad segre-
gation in Louisiana, Michigan passed another law reiterating its 
commitment to allowing interracial marriage.205
In the aftermath of the Civil Rights Cases, most mid-Atlantic states 
passed civil rights laws rejecting “separate but equal”206 and prohibiting 
private acts of discrimination. Pennsylvania’s law of 1887, for example, 
imposed fines of fifty to one hundred dollars (a significant sum of money at 
the time) for denying equal access to public transportation, theaters, hotels, 
restaurants, and concerts “or [any] place of entertainment or amuse-
ment.”207 New Jersey’s act of 1884 imposed larger fines, of from $500 to 
$1,000 for the same denials of equal access.208 This law also created a right 
of the complaining witness to pursue a private action of debt for up to 
$500.209 The statute further provided for the possibility of jailing offenders 
for up to one year.210 In addition to civil rights, the law protected the right 
to serve on a jury, and allowed for a fine of up to five thousand dollars for 
any official who refused to call African Americans for jury service. This is 
a dramatic alternative to the acts of Virginia judges who refused to call 
202. But see Berea College, where white southerners litigated to preserve their integrated institu-
tion. Similarly, the white woman who was involved in a romantic relationship with a black man in Pace 
v. Alabama would not have been happy with the Supreme Court’s decision.
203. Many of these laws are discussed below. A summary of some of them is found in Paul 
Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973 (2005).
204. Act of April 11, 1883, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 16. The politics of this law are discussed in Paul 
Finkelman, The Promise of Equality and the Limits of Law: From the Civil War to World War II, in
THE HISTORY OF MICHIGAN LAW 187-213 (Paul Finkelman & Martin J. Hershock eds., 2006).
205. Act of June 15, 1899, No. 247, 1899 Mich. Pub. Acts 387, 387-388; see generally Finkelman, 
supra note 204.
206. For a good discussion of these acts, see David McBride, Mid-Atlantic State Courts and the 
Struggle With the “Separate but Equal” Doctrine: 1880-1939, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 569 (1986).
207. Act of May 19, 1887, 1887 Pa. Laws 130.
208. Act of May 10, 1884, 1884 N.J. Laws 113.
209. Id.; see also McBride, supra note 206, at 584-85.
210. 1884 N.J. Laws at 113.
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black jurors. In Miller v. Stampul211 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld 
the application of this law, imposing a $500 fine (a huge sum of money at 
the time), against a theater owner who refused to admit blacks on the same 
basis as whites.
This support for civil rights was not limited to the east coast. In 1881, 
a Cincinnati jury awarded a black woman $1,000—an enormous sum of 
money at the time—when a railroad forced her to ride in a smoking car 
instead of honoring her ticket for the first-class car.212 This is in dramatic 
contrast to the Mississippi statute at issue in Louisville, New Orleans, & 
Texas Railway Company v. Mississippi.213 Three years after the Cincinnati 
jury gave such a resounding endorsement to equality, Ohio adopted a new 
civil rights law declaring that all its citizens were “equal before the law,” 
and that such a status was “essential to just government.”214 The statute 
prohibited private businesses from discriminating, and specifically prohib-
ited discrimination in all “inns, public conveyances on land or water, thea-
ters and other places of public amusement.”215 Later that year, Ohio 
amended this law to also cover “inns, restaurants, eating-houses, and bar-
ber-shops, and all other places of public accommodation and amuse-
ment.”216 Three years later, Ohio repealed its last remaining black laws, by 
enacting the “Arnett bill,” a law sponsored by Benjamin Arnett, a black 
state legislator who represented predominately white Green County.217 In 
1894, Ohio raised the maximum fines for violations of its civil rights laws 
from $100 to $500, raised the maximum jail time from 30 days to 90 days, 
and most important, imposed for the first time a statutory minimum for 
violators of $50 or 30 days in jail.218 The year before the Supreme Court 
upheld segregation in Plessy, Wisconsin passed a law “to protect all citi-
zens in their civil and legal rights.”219
In May 1885, Michigan passed “An Act to protect all citizens in their 
civil rights.”220 The law declared that all persons “within the jurisdiction” 
211. 84 A. 201, 202 (N.J. 1912).
212. See Gray v. Cincinnati S. R.R. Co., 11 F. 683 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882); see also Patricia Hagler 
Minter, The Failure of Freedom: Class Gender, and the Evolution of Segregated Transit Law in the 
Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 993 (1995).
213. 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
214. Act of February 7, 1884, 1884 Ohio Laws 15; see also DAVID A. GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND 
THE COLOR LINE, 1860-1915, at 46 (1976).
215. 1884 Ohio Laws at 15.
216. Act of March 27, 1884, 1884 Ohio Laws 90.
217. GERBER, supra note 214, at 241-42. 
218. Act of Feb. 7, 1894, 1894 Ohio Laws 17.
219. Act of April 13, 1895, 1895 Wis. Sess. Laws 428.
220. Act of May 28, 1885, No. 130, 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts 131. For a more detailed discussion of 
the Michigan experience, see Finkelman, supra note 204, at 187. 
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of Michigan were “entitled to the full and equal accommodations, ad-
vantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating-houses, bar-
ber shops, public conveyances on land and water, theaters, and all other 
places of public accommodation and amusement.”221 The law provided one 
hundred dollar fines and up to thirty days in jail for anyone who violated 
the law.222 The law also imposed similar fines and punishments for “any 
officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summon-
ing of jurors” who excluded potential grand jurors or petit jurors on the 
basis of race.223 With this law, Michigan seemed to have created a society 
where race did not matter, at least in the public sphere.
In 1890, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld this law in a suit against 
a restaurant that refused to seat a black man in its main dining room.224 In 
supporting this suit, Justice Allen B. Morse offered an extraordinary de-
nunciation of racism and prejudice. The opinion reflected the age in which 
Morse lived, when even the most egalitarian whites probably did not truly 
believe that the races were equal. Morse implied that being black was 
similar to having a birth defect or “deformity.” But Morse paternalistically 
rejected treating people differently simply because they have a “deformi-
ty.” Nevertheless, despite its paternalism and mild racism, Morse’s opinion 
was a profound rejection of segregation and race prejudice. In the end, he 
declared that racism “is not only not humane, but unreasonable.”225 Thus, 
Morse asserted:
[I]n Michigan there must be and is an absolute, unconditional equality of 
white and colored men before the law. The white man can have no rights 
or privileges under the law that is denied to the black man. Socially peo-
ple may do as they please within the law, and whites may associate to-
gether, as may blacks, and exclude whom they please from their 
dwellings and private grounds; but there can be no separation in public 
places between people on account of their color alone which the law will 
sanction.226
Morse argued that under the common law white men had always had 
“a remedy against any unjust discrimination to the citizen in all public 
places” and that since the adoption of the Civil War Amendments, and 
especially in light of the Michigan Civil Rights Act,
the colored man, under the law of this state, was entitled to the same 
rights and privileges in public places as the white man, and must be 
221. 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts at 131-32.
222. Id. at 132.
223. Id.
224. See Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718 (Mich. 1890).
225. Id. at 721.
226. Id. at 720.
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treated the same there; and that his right of action for any injuries arising 
from an unjust discrimination against him is just as perfect and sacred in 
the courts as that of any other citizen.227
Emphatically denouncing racism, Justice Morse declared that “any 
discrimination founded upon the race or color of the citizen is unjust and 
cruel, can have no sanction in the law of this state.”228 Morse believed that 
this sort of discrimination, which could be found in other states, “taints 
justice.”229 Morse then demolished the racist notion that God had made 
blacks inferior to whites. He argued that such ideas were founded on rea-
soning that “does not commend itself either to the heart or judgment.”230
As he wrote this opinion, Morse may have reflected on his own life. 
As a young man, he had served in the 16th Michigan Regiment and lost an 
arm storming Missionary Ridge. Thus, he understood the cost of equality: 
“The humane and enlightened judgment of our people has decided—
although it cost blood and treasure to do so—that the negro [sic] is a man; a 
freeman; a citizen; and entitled to equal rights before the law with the white 
man.”231
In 1889, in Messenger v. State,232 the Nebraska Supreme Court up-
held a Nebraska law enacted “to provide that all citizens shall be entitled
to the same civil rights, and to punish all persons for violations of its pro-
visions.”233 The Court explicitly mentioned slavery, and by doing so indi-
rectly recalled the Civil War and the way it had forever changed American 
society and American law. The case involved a white barber who refused
to shave a black man. The court remanded the case for further proceed-
ings on technical grounds, but significantly supported civil rights, noting:
The statute will not permit him to say to one: “You were a slave or a
son of a slave; therefore I will not shave you.” Such prejudices are un-
worthy of our better manhood, and are clearly prohibited by the statute.
In this state a colored man may sit upon a jury, cast his ballot at any
general or special election where he is entitled to vote, and his vote will
be counted, and he has the right to travel upon any public conveyance
the same as if he were white. The authority of the state to prohibit dis-
criminations on account of color in places of public resort, as a barber-
shop, is undoubted, and the proprietors of such shops can adopt and en-




230. Id. at 721.
231. Id.
232. 41 N.W. 638 (Neb. 1889).
233. Act of Mar. 4, 1885, 1885 Neb. Laws 393.
234. Messenger, 41 N.W. at 639.
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In 1905, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld a judgment against a restau-
rant that refused to serve a black man.235 This case was decided three
years before the Supreme Court upheld Kentucky’s law requiring segrega-
tion of private colleges in Berea College. This case reflects the Iowa 
cases of the 1860s and 1870s supporting integration.236 Similarly, in
1902, an Ohio court upheld the right of a black man to sue under a state
civil rights statute after he was denied the right to use a bowling alley at a
public resort.237 The court cited the Michigan court’s decision in Ferguson
v. Gies.238
The Northern laws and decision supporting civil rights in this period 
illustrate that there was a powerful cultural and legal alternative to the rac-
ism of the Supreme Court and its refusal to apply the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as its framers intended—to create a more just and racially fair society. 
That the Court did not do this was not as function of the logic of the law,239
it was more a result of the lack of experience that these Justices had with 
liberty, equality, and racial fairness, and their insensitivity to racial preju-
dice. They represented a narrow swath of elite white culture, and they were 
not willing to see that blacks were entitled equality or justice. Possibly, as 
Nelson charitably suggests the justices “were not racist,”240 but their deci-
sions certainly were, and it seems fair to suggest that so were a number of 
the members of the Court.
Judge Morse of Michigan better understood the meaning of the Civil 
War and the Constitutional changes it led to than did most of the more fa-
mous justices of the United States Supreme Court in this period. Indeed the 
only Justice on the Court who recognized the changes brought about by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its two companion Amendments—the Thir-
teenth and the Fifteenth—was John Marshall Harlan, who like Morse had 
served in the United States Army in the War of the Rebellion and fought 
not only to preserve the Union but also to end slavery and move the nation 
closer to equality.241
Harlan dissented in many of the race cases of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. He accurately compared the Court’s decision in 
235. Humburd v. Crawford, 105 N.W. 330 (Iowa 1905).
236. NELSON, supra note 2, at 151-52.
237. See Johnson v. Humphrey Pop Corn Co., 24 Ohio C.C. 135 (1902).
238 . See id. at 54.
239. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not 
been logic; it has been experience.”).
240. NELSON, supra note 2, at 186.
241. See generally LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL 
HARLAN (1999).
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Plessy to the most proslavery decision of the antebellum period: “In my 
opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as 
pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case.”242
He correctly argued: “The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of 
race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly 
inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law estab-
lished by the constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.”243
Nor, as the first part of Nelson’s book shows, could it be justified by the 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite my disagreement with his analysis of the Court’s race cases, I 
stand in awe of Nelson’s book for its stunning research and analysis of the 
drafting and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. A quarter of a century 
after he wrote it, Nelson’s book remains a powerful and important contri-
bution to our understanding of how the Fourteenth Amendment became 
part of Constitution. Indeed, the first two thirds of this book ought to be 
required reading for the members of the Supreme Court who insist on ap-
plying an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but who 
apparently have not bothered to actually learn its historical origins.244
Similarly, the current justices could learn much from Justice Harlan’s
final statement in Plessy, because it was much closer to the meaning of the 
Fourteenth than the crabbed, overly constricted, and often deeply racist 
opinions of the rest of the Justices in this period, and our own time as well.
I am of opinion that the state of Louisiana is inconsistent with the per-
sonal liberty of citizens, white and black, in that state, and hostile to both 
the spirit and letter of the constitution of the United States. If laws of like 
character should be enacted in the several states of the Union, the effect 
would be in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery, as an institution 
tolerated by law, would, it is true, have disappeared from our country; 
but there would remain a power in the states, by sinister legislation, to 
interfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings of freedom, to regulate 
civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race, and to place 
in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now 
constituting a part of the political community, called the ‘People of the 
United States,’ for whom, and by whom through representatives, our 
government is administered. Such a system is inconsistent with the guar-
anty given by the constitution to each state of a republican form of gov-
242. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
243. Id. at 562.
244. Compare Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014), with
Finkelman Brief, supra note 44.
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ernment, and may be stricken down by congressional action, or by the 
courts in the discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law 
of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contra-
ry notwithstanding.245
245. Id. at 563-64.
